The Euro Illusion in Consumers’ Price Estimation: An Italian–Irish Comparison in the Third Year of the Euro

The euro illusion is a transient phenomenon that consists of currency-related asymmetries in the intuitive judgment of product prices made by consumers. The results of a cross-country study in the third year after the introduction of the euro show a strong price estimation asymmetry in a country with an extreme exchange rate (Italy) and a weaker effect in a country in which the nominal values of the new and the old currency are much closer (Ireland). These results rule out proposed explanations of the euro illusion in price estimation that assume the sole influence of plausible anchors (reference prices stored in memory within the plausible price range), supporting instead accounts also endorsing the role of implausible anchors (reference prices outside the plausible price range). Beyond contributing to our theoretical understanding of the euro illusion, this research starts to unveil the interplay between structural factors (i.e., the currency exchange rate) and psychological mechanisms that produce long-lasting difficulties for consumers after a monetary changeover.

Business cycle measurement with some theory

A method to evaluate cyclical models not requiring knowledge of the DGP and the exact specification of the aggregate decision rules is proposed. We derive robust restrictions in a class of models; use some to identify structural shocks in the data and others to evaluate the class or contrast sub-models. The approach has good properties, even in small samples, and when the class of models is misspecified. The method is used to sort out the relevance of a certain friction (the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers) in a standard class of models.     

The Influence of Ownership and Compensation Practices on Charitable Activities

Recent accounting research provides evidence that similar profit‐based compensation incentives are used in for‐profit and nonprofit hospitals. Because charity care reduces profits, such incentives should lead for‐profit hospital managers to reduce charity care levels. Nonprofit hospital managers, however, may respond differently to the same incentives because they face a different set of institutional pressures and constraints. We compare the association between pay‐for‐performance incentives and charity care in for‐profit and nonprofit hospitals. We find a negative and significant association between charity care and our proxy for profit‐based incentives in for‐profit hospitals, and no significant association in nonprofit hospitals. These results suggest that linking manager pay to profitability does not appear to discourage charity care in nonprofit hospitals. Apparently, the nonprofit mission, institutional pressures, and ownership constraints moderate the potentially negative effects of profit‐based incentives. Because this evidence partially alleviates concerns over nonprofit compensation arrangements that mirror those used in for‐profit hospitals, it should be of interest to regulators and policymakers. In addition, this study provides insights into accounting researchers about institutional and organizational influences that affect managerial responses to financial incentives in compensation contracts.     

Notes on a Mischaracterization of the Classical Theory of Value

This paper discusses the widespread view that the classical determination of relative prices is closely connected to the study of the conditions allowing for the 'reproduction' of the economy. It is argued that this view obscures the generality of Sraffa's contribution and, furthermore, that it does not provide a solid criterion for distinguishing the classical from the marginalist approach to the theory of value.     

Technology,property rights and organizational diversity in the software industry

Why do open- and closed-source productions co-exist? To address this question, the paper studies the viability of distinct systems for software development. The model shows that: (a) for low design costs of modularity, both open- and closed-source productions are viable systems; (b) closed-source production is more likely to be adopted the greater the expected rents on software; and (c) production efficiency is not a necessary condition for the stochastic stability of a system to obtain. These three results can shed light on the emergence of organizational diversity in the software industry. The paper adds to the literature in three ways: first, it considers property rights and technology as endogenous variables in the process of system design; second it argues that in producing software multiple equilibrium designs may exist; and third, it shows that, in because of high rents and low design costs of modularity, production inefficiency can be persistent.     

Coherent Distortion Risk Measures and Higher-Order Stochastic Dominances

Abstract

We show that the only coherent distortion risk measure that is consistent with respect to 3-convex order and hence with stochastic dominance of order 3 is the expected value, thus generalizing previous results of Hurlimann and solving a problem posed by Yamai and Yoshiba.     

The effects of technology shocks on hours and output: a robustness analysis

We analyze the effects of neutral and investment‐specific technology shocks on hours and output. Long cycles in hours are removed in a variety of ways. Hours robustly fall in response to neutral shocks and robustly increase in response to investment‐specific shocks. The percentage of the variance of hours (output) explained by neutral shocks is small (large); the opposite is true for investment‐specific shocks. ‘News shocks’ are uncorrelated with the estimated technology shocks. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When and how politicians take ‘scandalous’ decisions?

We study the decisions of a politician who maximizes his probability of being re-elected, which depends on the enactment of legislative instruments defined ‘scandalous’ because of their highly redistributive content. The agents are a politician and the voters; the legislative instruments available to the legislator are ordinary and executive laws, which differ according to their visibility. The theoretical model predicts that ‘scandalous’ legislation tends to be passed at the beginning of the legislature, while ‘non scandalous’, broader legislation, is approved mostly at the end of the legislation. Scandalous decisions, moreover, tend to be implemented by means of less visible executive legislation, while ordinary acts are mainly used to implement non scandalous decisions. This explanation of the genesis of legislation cycles is consistent with the findings of the empirical literature.     

The Board of Directors and The Adoption of Quality Management Tools

Abstract

The article examines the role of the board of directors in Local Public Utilities (LPUs). It aims at verifying empirically if a correlation exists between specific characteristics of the board of directors and the adoption of innovative arrangements addressing emerging needs of users and citizens (i.e. quality). By means of applying multivariate statistical methods to a random sample of sixty Italian LPUs, this study finds the relational capital of the boards affecting the take up of quality-oriented actions by LPUs. These results support the resource-dependence theory, neglected by mainstream literature.